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Abstract: In this paper, we offer an overview of the basic structure of Kant’s 
account of cognition, of the conditions on the notion of cognition most 
central to the first Critique, and how they are satisfied in the case of human 
beings. Our primary aim in this regard is to provide a comprehensive (albeit 
not exhaustive) framework for understanding Kant’s account of (theoretical) 
cognition. In the course of doing so, we argue for various interpretative 
claims, which, taken together, amount to a novel understanding of Kant’s 
account of cognition. First, we argue that cognition is a mental state that 
determines a given object by attributing general features to it. Second, we 
explain what it means for Kant for an object to be given; givenness in the 
relevant sense involves an immediate relation to an existing object. These 
first two claims imply that cognition (Erkenntnis) is distinct from knowledge 
(Wissen), both in Kant’s sense and in our modern sense. Third, we note some
fundamental ambiguities about what sensibility and understanding are, and 
point out that purely causal interpretations of these faculties are 
2problematic. Fourth, we distinguish between an intuition and an intuitive 
representation (analogous to the distinction between a concept and a 
discursive representation) in such a way that an intuition is one specific kind 
of intuitive representation. Fifth, we describe two different accounts of 
concepts (‘logical’ and ‘psychological’) and explain how they complement 
each other (despite their distinctness). Sixth, we diagnose several confusions
regarding whether Kant is or is not a non-conceptualist about intuitions 
(though without attempting a definitive resolution to that debate). Finally, we
show how our analysis of cognition clarifies what the most promising lines of 
argument are for Kant’s claim that we cannot have cognition of the objects 
of traditional metaphysics (while still allowing for limited kinds of knowledge 
of things in themselves).
Keywords: Kant, cognition, knowledge, things in themselves, representation, 
intuition, concept, sensibility, understanding, reason, metaphysics
Introduction
Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason undertakes a systematic investigation of the 
possibility of synthetic cognition a priori so as to determine whether this kind
of cognition is possible in the case of traditional metaphysics.1 While much 
scholarly attention has been devoted to the distinction between analytic and 
3synthetic judgments as well as to that between the a priori and the a 
posteriori, less attention has been devoted to understanding exactly what 
cognition (Erkenntnis) is for Kant. In particular, it is often insufficiently clear 
what kind of mental state cognition is, what the exact nature of the 
conditions on cognition is, and how they are satisfied in the case of human 
beings. To bring greater clarity to these issues, we propose to investigate the
nature of cognition along two different dimensions. 
On the one hand, we think it useful to have a clear grasp of the basic 
structure of Kant’s account of cognition, the conditions on the notion of 
cognition most central to the project undertaken in the first Critique, and 
how they are satisfied in the case of human beings.2 Our primary aim in this 
regard is to provide a comprehensive (albeit not exhaustive) framework for 
understanding Kant’s account of (theoretical) cognition. 
On the other hand, we also argue for various interpretative claims, 
which, taken together, amount to a novel understanding of Kant’s account of
cognition. First, we argue that, according to the conception of (theoretical) 
cognition most central to the first Critique, cognition is a mental state that 
determines a given object by attributing general features to it. Thus, my 
awareness of a red ball in front of me as red or as a ball qualifies as 
cognition. Second, we explain what it means for Kant for an object to be 
given; givenness in the relevant sense involves an immediate relation to an 
existing object. These first two claims imply that cognition (Erkenntnis) is 
distinct from knowledge (Wissen), both in Kant’s sense and in our modern 
4sense. Third, we note some fundamental ambiguities about what sensibility 
and understanding are, and point out that purely causal interpretations of 
these faculties are problematic. Fourth, we distinguish between an intuition 
and an intuitive representation (analogous to the distinction between a 
concept and a discursive representation) in such a way that an intuition is 
one specific kind of intuitive representation. Fifth, we describe two different 
accounts of concepts (‘logical’ and ‘psychological’) and explain how they 
complement each other (despite their distinctness). Sixth, we diagnose 
several confusions regarding whether Kant is or is not a non-conceptualist 
about intuitions (albeit without attempting a definitive resolution to that 
debate). Finally, we show how our analysis of cognition clarifies what the 
most promising lines of argument are for Kant’s claim that we cannot have 
cognition of the objects of traditional metaphysics (while still allowing for 
limited kinds of knowledge of things in themselves). 
We divide our investigation into five sections. In section 1, we explore 
Kant’s various conceptions of cognition. In the sense most relevant to the 
first Critique, we take cognition to be a representation that determines a 
given object by attributing general features to it. It thus requires that the 
object be given (givenness condition) and determined, or thought, through 
concepts (thought condition). For human beings, objects can be given only 
through sensibility and thought only by the understanding. In section 2, we 
clarify Kant’s notion of sensibility and the different kinds of sensible 
representations he envisions (such as intuitions), and explain how they allow 
5the givenness condition to be satisfied. In section 3, we turn to Kant’s 
account of the understanding and its representations (concepts, judgments, 
and inferences) and distinguish between two complimentary accounts of 
concepts, both of which contribute to explaining how the thought condition 
can be satisfied. 
In section 4, we consider how the givenness and thought conditions 
can be jointly satisfied by articulating two models of how sensibility and 
understanding cooperate to bring about cognition. On the one model, 
cognitions are judgments (and thus thoroughly discursive representations) in
which concepts are applied to objects given in intuition. On the other model, 
cognitions are representations that have both intuitive and discursive 
aspects. Since these two models can apply to cognitions of different kinds, 
they can be seen as complementary accounts of how the givenness and 
thought conditions are satisfied. We then turn to the question of whether, for
Kant, intuitions could represent objects without concepts, and suggest that 
once different senses of ‘intuition’ and ‘representing an object’ have been 
distinguished, at least some seemingly conflicting answers turn out to be 
compatible. Finally, in section 5, we consider reason as the faculty that is 
responsible for relations between cognitions in syllogisms and in natural 
science, and investigate the principled limits to our cognition in metaphysics.
In these ways, we wish not only to highlight various aspects of Kant’s 
account of cognition that are worth exploring in more detail, but also to 
convey that Kant’s account of cognition is part of a highly differentiated 
6theory of mental representation that is much more complex and interesting 
than is commonly appreciated.
1. Cognition: Basic Distinctions
In this section, we first introduce different senses in which Kant uses the 
term ‘cognition’ (section 1.1) and then offer four brief remarks on the 
relations between (human) cognition and knowledge, its object, divine 
cognition, and the subject matter of the first Critique (section 1.2). 
 
1.1. Different Senses of Cognition in Kant
In different passages throughout his corpus, Kant attributes a wide range of 
meanings to the term ‘Erkenntnis.’ For example, the so-called Stufenleiter 
passage in the first Critique, which provides a taxonomy of different kinds of 
representation, characterizes perception as “representation with 
consciousness” and cognition as “objective perception” (A320/B376). 
According to this passage, a cognition is a conscious representation that 
represents an object.3 Taken in this broad sense, it explicitly contrasts only 
with sensation, which is not, as such, objective, and with any representation 
of which we are not conscious. Kant then seems to identify intuitions and 
7concepts as its species, with further subdivisions under concepts, in such a 
way that even an idea, which is defined as a concept of an object that cannot
be given in possible experience, is classified as a cognition in this broad 
sense. 
Kant provides another classification in the so-called Jäsche Logik, 
where he distinguishes seven degrees of cognition (Jäsche, 9:64–65).4 The 
first degree is mere representation, the second conscious representation, 
while the third is being acquainted with something (etwas kennen) and the 
fourth being acquainted with something with consciousness (erkennen, 
cognoscere). The fifth is to conceive (intelligere), or to represent through 
concepts of the understanding, the sixth to cognize through reason, while 
the seventh and highest degree of cognition is comprehension (begreifen, 
comprehendere), which is to cognize through reason a priori. Though all 
seven are degrees of cognition, Kant singles out the fourth by labeling it 
‘erkennen.’ 
However, in various passages in the Transcendental Analytic, Kant 
identifies a narrower notion of cognition, according to which a cognition is a 
conscious representation of a given object and of (at least some of) its 
general features. Cognition in this sense arises when one determines an 
object given in intuition by applying a concept to it, as when one judges, or is
consciousness of, say, a ball in front of one as red. Kant has this notion in 
mind when he claims: “there are two conditions under which alone the 
cognition of an object is possible: first, intuition, through which it is given, 
8but only as appearance; second, concept, through which an object is 
thought that corresponds to this intuition” (A92/B125).5 Cognition in this 
sense requires two fundamentally distinct kinds of representations, intuitions
and concepts. While intuitions relate immediately to particular objects as 
such, concepts relate to a potential multitude of objects mediately through 
marks, i.e. through features that objects can have in common.6 According to 
this passage, two conditions must be satisfied for cognition in this narrow 
sense. First, the object must be given, since cognition must actually latch 
onto an object, and intuition satisfies that condition insofar as it immediately 
relates to the object represented in the intuition. Second, the given object 
must be thought through concepts, since cognition must render the object 
intelligible, and concepts do so by representing the given object’s features 
as general, i.e. features it has in common with other objects.7 In the 
following, we refer to these as the givenness and the thought conditions.
In line with the distinction between intuitions and concepts, Kant 
distinguishes between two faculties that are likewise different in kind, 
sensibility and understanding.8 Sensibility is said to be receptive or passive 
insofar as the mind must be “affected” (acted on) from without and is the 
faculty of intuitions, whereas the understanding is said to be spontaneous or 
active insofar as it is the faculty of concepts (and judgments).9 Kant famously
claims that “[t]houghts without content are empty, intuitions without 
concepts are blind. . . . Only from their unification [viz. the unification of the 
understanding and of the senses] can cognition arise” (A51/B75–76). Thus it 
9is only through sensibility that objects are “given” in such a way that 
cognition refers, or can be shown to refer, to existing objects and represents 
their non-general features, and it is only through the understanding that (the
general features of) objects can be “thought,” or “determined,” by discursive
concepts. It is this narrow sense of cognition that Kant, in one place, calls 
“cognition in the proper sense [Erkenntnis in eigentlicher Bedeutung]” (A78/
B103; cf. B149).10
Given the differences between these notions of cognition, Kant’s use of
the term may appear inconsistent. However, we think that it reflects a 
genuine sensitivity on his part to the rich variety of kinds of representation 
that can be relevant in different contexts.11 Further, despite this diversity, 
Kant’s primary focus in the first Critique is clearly on the narrower notion of 
cognition. For in the Transcendental Doctrine of Elements, which constitutes 
the bulk of the first Critique, he provides an analysis of the conditions of 
cognition in this sense. Specifically, in the Transcendental Aesthetic Kant 
provides an analysis of sensibility, showing how objects are given in sensible 
intuition, and in the Transcendental Logic, he offers an account of the 
understanding (i.e. our intellectual faculties, including reason), showing how 
objects can be thought through discursive concepts and involved in 
inferences of reason. 
1.2. Clarificatory Remarks
10
Four general remarks about cognition in the narrow sense are in order. First, 
it is important to distinguish cognition (Erkenntnis) from knowledge 
(Wissen).12 Kant understands knowledge as a mode of assent, or “taking to 
be true” (Fürwahrhalten), that is based on an objectively sufficient ground, 
that is, an objective justification that is sufficient for certainty (A822/B850) 
and truth (Jäsche, 9:66).13 Kant’s conception of knowledge is closely related 
to the traditional tripartite definition of knowledge as justified true belief 
since belief (in our current sense) is an instance of “taking something to be 
true” and an objectively sufficient ground is a kind of justification that 
secures truth. But knowledge in this sense is clearly fundamentally different 
from cognition. Since cognition is a conscious representation of a given 
object and its general features, it requires neither an act of assent nor an 
objective justification. Thus, I can have a representation of the ball in front of
me as being red without endorsing the judgment “this ball is red,” since I 
might not have assessed the relevant evidence or I might have done so and 
(rightly or wrongly) believe it to be a white ball illuminated by red light. 
Conversely, Kant does not claim that knowledge requires that an object be 
given or that we attribute some general feature to it.14 Despite these basic 
differences, cognition could nonetheless contribute to the kind of objectively 
sufficient grounds required for knowledge, though Kant does not explicitly 
say so or argue for it.15
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Second, in his explications of intuitions and concepts, Kant speaks of 
them “relating” to (beziehen sich auf) their objects, but without clarifying 
what specific kind of relation he intends. We suggest that intuitions and 
concepts relate to their objects both by representing them, i.e. having an 
objective representational content, and by referring to them.16 Below, we 
explain how each one represents and refers to objects and how cognition 
arises as a result.
Third, it is important to distinguish human cognition from (possible) 
divine cognition. Instead of having separate faculties of sensibility and 
understanding that make distinct contributions to cognition (through sensible
intuitions and discursive concepts), the divine mind would have a single 
intuitive intellect that has cognition in an intellectual intuition—a 
representation that actively produces its objects, rather than having them be
given from without, and that comprehends those objects immediately 
without the need for concepts.17 Accordingly, the distinction between 
sensibility and understanding is, for Kant, a consequence of the finitude of 
human minds, which manifests itself in both sensibility’s dependence on 
external causes (on “affection” and on objects being given to it from without 
(B72)) and the understanding’s discursivity (the generality of its concepts 
and their dependence on sensible representations).18 
Finally, cognition in the narrow sense is central to the subject matter 
and goal of the first Critique. The question that motivates Kant to undertake 
a critique of pure reason is whether the claims of traditional metaphysics put
12
forward by his rationalist and empiricist predecessors concerning God, the 
immortality of the soul, and freedom could be synthetic cognitions a priori. 
As it turns out, providing a satisfying explanation of synthetic a priori 
cognition requires not only a thorough investigation of the givenness and 
thought conditions on cognition, but also a “revolution [Umänderung] of our 
way of thinking.” The revolutionary idea is not just that human cognition has 
sensible and intellectual conditions, but also that the sensible conditions are 
merely subjective (in that nothing corresponds to them in the objects) and 
are “put into” the objects by the cognizing subject, with the result that the 
objects of cognition are “mere appearances” rather than “things as they are 
in themselves” (Bxviii). That is, the distinction at the heart of Transcendental
Idealism is required because synthetic a priori cognition is possible only if the
objects of human cognition are not things in themselves, but appearances. 
Thus, both the necessity of Transcendental Idealism and the fate of 
metaphysics rest on the possibility of cognition in the narrow sense.19 
2. Sensibility, Intuition, and the Givenness Condition
Kant describes sensibility as a receptive or passive faculty through which 
objects are given to us in intuition, where an intuition is a singular 
representation that relates immediately to particular objects. According to 
Kant, objects must be given to be cognized and they cannot be given 
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through a discursive understanding (A19/B33). This basic position gives rise 
to several fundamental questions about the givenness condition. What 
exactly does it mean for an object to be given (section 2.1) and how is one to
understand sensibility (section 2.2), sensations (section 2.3), and sensible 
intuitions—specifically, their singularity and immediacy (section 2.4), their 
form and matter (section 2.5), and their intuitive character (section 2.6)—in 
such a way that they can contribute to cognition by allowing the givenness 
condition to be satisfied?
2.1. Givenness 
Kant never defines what it means for an object to be given,20 but his usage 
suggests that an object is given if and only if the object is present to mind so
as to guarantee that one’s representation refers to it, and to make it possible
to represent that particular object and (some of) its non-general features. In 
the human case, objects can be given only through sensibility, which can 
occur either when the object “affects the mind in a certain way” (A19/B33) or
when the mind constructs the object “in pure intuition” (A713/B741). While 
affection gives rise to sensations, which are required for empirical cognitions,
the construction of objects in pure intuition is required for mathematical 
cognition.21 In both cases, the givenness of an object implies that the object 
exists.22 In this way, an object’s being represented in intuition guarantees 
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that it is given, since the intuition allows one both to refer to the object and 
to represent its non-general features.23
Kant also considers the possibility that objects are given to God 
through his own intuitive understanding (or intellect) rather than through 
sensibility (B135, B138–39, and B145).24 Thus, Kant is committed to a 
generic sense of givenness (the object is present to mind in a way that 
guarantees the existence of the object and makes possible the 
representation of that particular object) that holds both for God and for 
human beings, and to a more specific sense according to which givenness for
human beings includes, in the empirical case, an affection relation and a 
correspondingly receptive faculty of sensibility.
2.2. Sensibility
Understanding givenness in this way makes it natural to interpret the faculty 
of sensibility in causal terms. That is, it is tempting to think that objects are 
given to us because they in some sense cause representations in us and 
such a causal relationship allows us to represent and refer to the object that 
causes those representations. This interpretation is also suggested by Kant’s 
repeatedly describing sensibility in terms of receptivity, passivity, and 
affection, all of which have causal connotations.
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In addition, a causal interpretation can help to explain two distinctive 
features of empirical intuitions. First, it can explain how an empirical intuition
is supposed to relate to a particular object, since an empirical intuition can 
both represent and refer to the object that affects it in virtue of the object 
being its cause. Kant’s view would resemble contemporary causal theories of
reference in this respect. Second, an intuition provides evidence of the 
existence of the object that caused it, since, in the empirical case, the 
intuition would not exist if the object did not cause it.25 
However, sensibility cannot be purely passive or receptive, because it 
must produce representations in response to being acted on from without. 
External objects do not generate representations that the human mind 
simply receives; instead, an object acts on the mind and the mind creates a 
sensible representation in response. Moreover, the case of mathematics 
shows that sensibility does not require any causal impact from external 
objects. For mathematical objects cannot cause sensations, though they are 
clearly sensible according to Kant. Since construction in a priori intuition 
shows that mathematical objects are present to the mind, Kant can stay true
to his claim that all objects of cognition must be given through sensibility. As 
a result, a consistent understanding of sensibility cannot require affection.26
In response, one could claim that the a priori intuitions involved in the 
construction of mathematical objects are sensible in a merely derivative 
sense. That is, even though mathematical cognition does not involve matter 
caused from without, it would be sensible in that the forms of intuition 
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involved in it are the same forms that take up sensations in empirical 
cognition. Yet such an interpretation can seem problematic, since by 
acknowledging both a derivative and a non-derivative sense of sensibility, it 
cannot offer a unified account of sensibility. Despite the drawbacks of this 
interpretation, it may well represent the default position. 
However, one can explore other interpretive possibilities. In his 
Inaugural Dissertation, Kant contrasts his view with that of Leibniz, Wolff, and
Baumgarten by pointing out: “sensitive [or sensible] representations can be 
very distinct and representations which belong to the understanding can be 
extremely confused” (Inaugural Dissertation, 2:394). When we see, e.g. a 
brightly illuminated red object, we can have a very lively and vivid 
representation of it and can easily distinguish it from others, even if it is 
unclear to us whether the concept “scarlet” or “crimson” applies. Given that 
Kant defines the clarity (Klarheit) of a representation in general as 
consciousness of the difference between it and other representations 
(B415n), this example shows that the clarity of a representation that Kant 
calls sensitive (sensitivum), or sensible (sinnlich), is distinct from the 
discursive clarity of concepts.27 As a result, one might define sensibility as 
the faculty of representations that can admit of the kind of clarity that is on 
display with the brightly illuminated object. Whether the textual evidence 
suffices to sustain such an interpretation is unclear.28 However, it would have
the virtue of allowing for an account of sensibility that applies univocally to 
our representations of empirical and mathematical objects while not 
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precluding the possibility that some sensible representations are caused by 
external objects.
2.3. Sensations 
Kant defines sensation as a conscious representation that “relates merely to 
the subject as a modification of its state” (A321/B377) and as “the effect of 
an object on the capacity for representation insofar as we are affected by it” 
(A19/B33). Given that a sensation refers only to how the subject is affected 
and not directly to the object, it is not surprising that Kant does not classify it
as a cognition (e.g. in the Stufenleiter passage). However, since he does 
classify sensations as a kind of representation, they must, it seems, have 
some kind of representational content. Also, insofar as the difference 
between a priori and empirical cognition derives from sensations, sensations 
must play a crucial role in empirical cognition, and they could do so in virtue 
of their representational content.29 
At the same time, specifying the representational content of 
sensations is challenging. Since they are non-conceptual, their content 
cannot be general. Nor can their content be straightforwardly spatio-
temporal, since space and time are forms of intuition that are distinct from 
sensations (as the matter of intuition). One might identify the content of 
sensations with raw feels. But insofar as raw feels are experienced at a 
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particular time, even they may be more than mere sensations in Kant’s 
sense. Alternatively, one could stress that sensations represent not simply a 
subject’s state, but also how the subject is affected by the object. This would 
make explicit that even though sensations are subjective and thus do not 
represent any object on their own, they are also not purely subjective since 
they have an indirect orientation towards an object.30 
Several further aspects of the representational content of sensations 
are relevant. First, reference to a particular object could be accounted for 
either by the causal link between a sensation and its object (noted above) or 
by the formal features of intuition (specifically, the spatio-temporal location 
the sensed object occupies) or both. Second, sensations must be involved in 
explaining our awareness of the existence of empirical objects. Much turns 
here on whether one thinks of sensations as representations of which one is 
conscious in everyday situations (like pains or pleasures) or whether one 
classifies such conscious sensible representations as empirical intuitions and 
thinks of sensations as posited on purely theoretical grounds.31
2.4. Intuition: Singularity and Immediacy
Kant claims that the givenness condition is satisfied not by means of 
sensation, but rather by means of intuition. But how exactly does an intuition
help to satisfy that condition? As we saw above, Kant defines intuitions in 
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terms of their singularity and their immediacy.32 Intuitions are singular in at 
least two senses. First, an intuition is singular in that its representational 
content is particular rather than general and it refers to particulars rather 
than to universals.33 In the human case, an intuition would represent 
particular sensible features of a particular object at a particular space-time 
location and it would refer to the particular that is at that location. Second, 
whereas the same concept can be used in a plurality of judgments, an 
intuition can occur only once. Put differently, while a concept (such as the 
concept of a ball) is essentially a type of representation that can be applied 
to different objects on different occasions, an intuition (such as the intuition 
of a particular ball) is essentially a token that depends, both in its existence 
and in its representational content, on (the causal relation to) its object.34 
Intuitions are immediate in that their reference is not mediated by any 
other representation that would refer to objects, such as concepts.35 But how
then can their relation to objects be positively characterized? Various 
proposals have been offered. One might understand intuition to involve a 
“direct presence to the mind,” taken in a phenomenological sense, where 
the directness of the phenomenal presence precludes any mediation.36 Or 
one might take it to involve the kind of direct reference illustrated by 
demonstrative terms, which require a context of use (typically place, time, or
person) to establish reference.37 
This account explains how an object can be said to be given in 
intuition. Specifically, the immediacy of intuition makes it possible for us 
20
both to be immediately aware of the existence of an object and to represent 
its non-general features. For an intuition is singular in virtue of representing 
an object with particular sensible qualities at a particular location in space 
and time. In the case of the red ball, the intuition we form might be of a 
particular instance of sphericality and of redness existing at the same spatio-
temporal location (though not, qua intuition, represented as red or 
spherical).38 Further, an intuition can refer to its object directly because no 
(objective) representation mediates between the intuition and its object and 
because the intuition depends on the object for its existence. 
2.5. Intuition: Form and Matter
This account draws heavily on a distinction between the form and matter of 
an intuition, where the form is claimed to be space and time and the matter, 
for empirical intuitions, is sensation.39 But what exactly is the relation 
between the form and matter of an intuition? One might think of sensations 
as the parts of an intuition and of space and time as the way in which these 
parts are ordered into a whole. However, an empirical intuition involves an 
empirical content that cannot be reduced to the contents of sensations 
arranged into a spatio-temporal whole. The redness of the ball represented 
in intuition does not derive from literally red sensations, since the 
representation of red already has spatial content. Insofar as the matter of an 
21
intuition provides the parts for an intuition, the representational content of 
the parts must, it seems, not remain unaltered by being taken up into an 
intuition. Similarly, the form does not merely rearrange the (representational
content of) sensations, but rather construes them as standing in specifically 
spatio-temporal relations, which suggests that the form of intuition adds 
distinctive content to the representational content of the intuition.
One may take guidance here from the way Kant aligns the matter-form
distinction with the determinable-determination distinction (e.g. at 
A266/B322). In general, Kant holds that the form determines the matter, and
the matter is determinable by the form. Further, Kant claims that for 
concepts the matter precedes the form insofar as something must be given 
before the concept can determine it, while for intuitions the form precedes 
the matter (A267/B323). For human intuition, then, the forms of space and 
time must determine the determinable sensations that are caused in us. This
suggests that an intuition has a determinate spatio-temporal content only by
the forms determining the sensations. By contrast, the matter makes two 
contributions. First, the matter of an empirical intuition must make 
accessible to the mind the existence of an object, leaving the object’s 
general features undetermined. Second, even if the representational content
of an intuition does not derive exclusively from its matter, the latter must 
somehow constrain how it is determined by the form.
22
2.6. Intuitive vs. Discursive Representation
Kant distinguishes not just between intuitions and concepts, but more 
generally between intuitive and discursive representations.40 Kant typically 
explains “discursive” representations in terms of their generality,41 which 
suggests that “intuitive” representations are singular.42 As we discuss in 
section 3.2 below, because discursive representations are general, the 
relation between them and their parts is one of logical containment. By 
contrast, the containment relation that holds for intuitive representations 
must be mereological. The distinction between sensible and discursive clarity
mentioned above (Section 2.2) reflects this difference in the structure of 
intuitive and discursive representations; indeed, Kant often speaks of 
“intuitive clarity” instead of “sensible” or “aesthetic” clarity (Deutlichkeit) 
(cf. Axvii). Relatedly, a contrast that Kant emphasizes with respect to 
intuitions and concepts might also hold for intuitive and discursive 
representations more generally; intuitive representations would contain parts
that are themselves intuitive representations, and are thus infinitely divisible
and “fine-grained,” while discursive representations contain only finitely 
many parts, which in turn are discursive representations.43 
Since judgments and inferences are clearly types of discursive 
representations beyond concepts, one might wonder whether Kant allows for
intuitive representations beyond intuitions (as defined e.g. at A19/B33). And 
indeed, Kant’s use of the term ‘intuitive representation’ at least suggests an 
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affirmative answer in some cases.44 For instance, he denies that “every 
intuitive representation of outer things includes at the same time their 
existence, for that may well be the mere effect of the imagination” (B278).45 
If givenness requires the existence of the given object and if objects are 
given in intuitions, then these “intuitive representations” of the imagination 
cannot be intuitions. Admittedly, Kant occasionally speaks of “intuitions of 
the imagination” (e.g. 5:254; cf. 7:167), but this may reflect the fact that he 
often does not distinguish between intuitive representations and intuitions 
proper or, alternatively, that he allows for different kinds of intuitions.46 
In sum, if intuitive representations are characterized by their 
particularity, their infinite divisibility (‘fine-grainedness’), or their specific 
kind of clarity and distinctness, there could be intuitive representations 
beyond intuitions proper. Note that while no representation could be both an 
intuition and a concept, Kant could allow for representations that are both 
intuitive and discursive (i.e. combine intuitive and discursive features).
3. Understanding, Concepts, Judgments, and the Thought Condition
Kant describes the understanding as an active or spontaneous faculty 
through which objects are thought, or determined, by concepts in judgments.
A concept is a general representation that relates to potentially many objects
mediately (by intuitions and/or marks) and a judgment is a combination of 
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concepts that can be a premise or conclusion in a syllogism.47 Since objects, 
to be cognized, must be thought, or rendered intelligible, and they cannot be
thought through sensibility, the (human) understanding must determine an 
object by applying a concept to what is given in sensible intuition in such a 
way that its general features can be thought.48 Yet it is possible to apply a 
concept to an object only if the concept has what Kant calls “objective 
reality,” or, equivalently, only if the object represented by the concept is 
“really possible” (as opposed to being merely logically possible). But how 
exactly does the understanding satisfy the thought condition by means of 
concepts and judgments? To answer this question, we explain the 
spontaneous and discursive nature of the understanding (section 3.1), two 
different aspects of concepts, namely their two-fold ability to classify objects 
and represent inferentially structured content and their role in combining 
sensible representations (section 3.2), the contribution these aspects make 
to concepts being indirect and general representations (section 3.3), and 
how the thought condition is satisfied by way of concepts (e.g. by 
establishing their objective reality) (section 3.4), and by objects being 
determined in judgment (section 3.5).
3.1. Spontaneity and Discursivity
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Kant characterizes the understanding as spontaneity in contrast to 
sensibility’s receptivity. However, it is unclear what he means by 
spontaneity. As we have seen (2.1), he cannot mean simply that the 
understanding is active, since sensibility, too, does not literally “receive” 
representations.49 Also, he cannot just mean that the understanding is 
independent from causal input, because sensibility’s a priori representations 
of space and time are independent from causal input as well.50 Finally, it 
cannot mean that the activity of the understanding is arbitrary, since Kant 
insists that many concepts are not arbitrary (Jäsche, 9:141), but rather 
involve a moment of necessity (e.g. A78/B104).51 We suggest that the 
spontaneity of the understanding is best understood in terms of its being 
active in a distinctive way. Two aspects are particularly relevant. First, the 
understanding brings into its representations a specific kind of unity, and it 
does so spontaneously or “on its own” insofar as this unity does not derive 
from the senses, but from an act that Kant calls ‘synthesis.’ Second, 
representations of the understanding are rendered non-arbitrary by actions 
that, even when we are not conscious of them, can be explained on the 
model of the self-conscious following of a rule. Both aspects of spontaneity 
contribute to explaining the representational content and objective character
of thought. That acts of synthesis unite a plurality of representations into the
representation of an object accounts for the complex, but unified content of 
thought, while the fact that these syntheses are rule-guided and thus not 
arbitrary accounts for their objective (i.e. inter-subjectively valid) character.
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Human understanding is also a discursive faculty; i.e. a faculty of 
cognition through discursive representations (A68/B93).52 Discursive 
representations such as concepts, judgments, or syllogisms are general 
representations that can involve logical containment-relations with other 
general representations; e.g. concepts contain other concepts (“marks”) in 
them by virtue of being contained under them (e.g. “spherical” is contained 
in “ball,”).53 Such representations are general in that (1) they (or their partial 
representations) represent features that a plurality of objects could, in 
principle, have, and thus both classify (or group together) and refer to a 
potentially infinite number of objects and (2) they are repeatable 
representations so that the same concept, judgment, or syllogism can be 
thought at different times. Though Kant defines concepts as general and 
indirect representations,54 which distinguishes them from intuitions, they, 
unlike judgments and syllogisms, can contain only other concepts.
3.2. Two Accounts of Concepts 
Kant expands on his definition of concepts first by accounting for the content
of, and the logical relations between, concepts in terms of their “marks” 
(Merkmale) and second by attributing to them a role in the “synthesis” of the
manifold of sensible intuition.55 
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Concepts, according to Kant, both contain “marks” and can themselves
be contained in other concepts as marks (Jäsche, 9:58).56 For example, the 
concept of a ball contains the marks “material object” and “spherical” and is 
itself contained in the concept “tennis ball.” Marks, in turn, are defined as 
general57 and partial representations that serve as “grounds of cognition” of 
either objects or their representations (Jäsche, 9:58).58 While a concept 
contains its marks in it, it in turn is contained under its marks (Jäsche, 9:95–
96).59 For example, “spherical” and “material” are contained in (the content 
of) the concept “ball,” which in turn is contained (as a special case) under 
both “spherical” and “material.” In this way, every concept is part of a 
hierarchy of inferentially related concepts that classify, or group together, 
objects that share a set of features. Because these containment relations are
crucial to Kant’s account of syllogism (see section 5), we call this his “logical”
account of concepts.60
In other places, Kant describes the role that concepts play in acts of 
the “synthesis of a sensible manifold.” “Synthesis” in general is “the action 
of putting different representations together with each other and 
comprehending their manifoldness in one cognition” (A77/B103).61 Acts of 
synthesis can generate concepts (unity of marks), judgments (unity of 
concepts), or syllogisms (unity of judgments). While marks, concepts, and 
judgments are discursive representations, Kant also posits a synthesis of a 
manifold of representations that are “given” and do not result from a prior 
act of synthesis.62 Kant calls this manifold “the manifold of intuition” (e.g. 
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A120, B130, A145/B185) and, in the case of cognition a priori, “the manifold 
of pure intuition” (e.g. A78/B104).63 Now according to Kant, concepts serve 
as “rules” for this kind of synthesis, by which he seems to mean that the way
in which the sensible manifold is combined into one representation 
“corresponds to,” and is somehow modeled on, the unity of the marks 
combined in the concept.64 Because this account of the role concepts play in 
acts of synthesis is part of his transcendental psychology, we call it Kant’s 
“psychological” account of concepts. 
3.3. The Generality and Indirectness of Concepts
Distinguishing between these two accounts of concepts helps to explain how 
concepts are general, and in which sense they are indirect representations. 
While Kant simply presupposes the generality of concepts in the logical 
account,65 the psychological account might provide an explanation of this 
feature of concepts. On this account, two acts of synthesis involve the same 
concept only if they proceed in accordance with the same rule and therefore 
result in the same kind of unity among a given manifold, even if the manifold
varies. For instance, consider the concept of a body, which we use as a rule 
for the synthesis that combines representations of extension, 
impenetrability, shape, etc. Now the same rule that allows me to represent 
this ball as a body also allows me to represent that racket as a body. The 
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generality of concepts is thus a consequence of their being essentially types 
of representations, that is, representations that can contribute the same 
content on different occasions,66 which in turn is a consequence of the 
spontaneity and discursivity of the understanding. Specifically, since 
concept-use is a rule-governed activity, the same rule can be used to 
synthesize different manifolds on different occasions in such a way that 
different objects can fall under the same concept. 
Concepts are indirect in two senses, one of which Kant explains in 
terms of marks (A320/B377) and the other in terms of a concept’s 
dependence on intuition (A19).67 In the first (intensional) sense, a concept is 
an indirect representation by representing its objects by means of other 
representations, the marks contained in that concept. In the second 
(extensional) sense, if a concept can be used to synthesize a manifold of 
intuition, it can refer to objects indirectly by way of that intuition, since 
intuitions are the only representations that refer to objects directly.
3.4. The Two Accounts of Concepts as Complementary
Each account covers different, but equally important and, in fact, 
complementary aspects of concepts and contributes to the way in the 
thought condition can be satisfied by involving concepts.
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According to Kant, concepts (even empirical ones) are discursive all the
way down. They do not have a sensible representational content, but contain
only marks (see Jäsche, 9:58). Therefore, they can (ostensibly) refer to 
objects only mediately, through intuitions. In the fundamental kind of case, a
concept can refer to an object by being used as a rule for the synthesis of 
sensible representations. It is this role that provides concepts with “objective
reality, i.e. a relation to objects” (e.g. B150). Concepts that cannot be used 
to synthesize a sensible manifold may still be said to represent something 
simply by virtue of the marks contained in them; but they do not refer to it in
the way required to determine a given object (e.g. A155/B194).68 Without 
this relation to sensible representations, concepts are “empty” and “without 
meaning and sense” and thus cannot contribute to satisfying the thought 
condition.69 
But the logical account is equally important for understanding how 
concepts allow us to satisfy the thought condition. The idea, very roughly, is 
that if something is represented as falling under a given concept, then that 
concept both represents the object as having a property that similar objects 
will have (so that they are thereby classified together) and brings inferential 
structure and thus an element of necessity to that representation (in the 
sense that if a concept applies to an object, then so will the concepts that 
are contained in it). Kant offers the following example of this latter feature: 
“the concept of body serves as the rule for our cognition of outer 
appearances” and thereby “makes necessary the representation of 
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extension, and with it that of impenetrability, of shape, etc.” (A106). Now 
extension, impenetrability, and shape are the marks contained in the 
concept of a body. Thus, cognizing something as a body makes it necessary 
that the given manifold be synthesized in accordance with the marks 
contained in that concept, excluding, for instance, that we cognize an “outer 
appearance” both as a body and as penetrable. If something is cognized as a
body, then it must be cognized as impenetrable.70 What the concept of a 
body thus contributes to this cognition is (1) an inferentially structured 
conceptual content in terms of its general features (body, impenetrability, 
etc.) and (2) a (conditional) necessity or non-arbitrariness in the way the 
manifold is synthesized.
Moreover, both the logical and the psychological accounts contribute to
explaining how the thought condition for cognition can be satisfied. The 
logical account explains how concepts can render an object intelligible by 
representing it through marks which (1) attribute features to it that it can 
share with some objects and not with others and (2) locate it in a larger 
classificatory structure. The psychological account explains how concepts 
can have “objective reality,” that is, can be used to determine given objects, 
by showing how the classificatory role of concepts and their inferential 
relations can apply to the objects that are given in sensible intuition. While 
the logical account depicts concepts in terms of their containment-relations, 
the psychological account explains how concepts “latch on” to the world in 
such a way that containment-relations can apply to them.71
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In sum, while the logical account explains how concepts can have both 
a classificatory role and an inferential structure, the psychological account 
explains how these features can apply to objects that can be given to us. 
Taken together, both accounts explain how concepts can render objects 
intelligible and thereby explain how the thought condition can be satisfied.
3.5. Judgment and Determination
A judgment, in the widest sense, is a conscious representation that unifies a 
plurality of representations under a concept (see 9:101; A68/B93). Since 
concepts can be used to unify a manifold of representations, concept-use 
and judgment, in this wide sense, coincide (A68/B93). In a narrower sense of 
the term ‘judgment,’ however, not all concept-use is judgmental. Kant 
provides an explicit definition of judgment as “the way to bring given 
cognitions to the objective unity of apperception,” contrasting it with 
(empiricist) conceptions according to which a judgment arises according to 
“laws of reproductive imagination” (B141). By invoking the unity of 
apperception, Kant is claiming that judgments are not simply representations
related by psychological laws, but rather must have a specific internal 
structure (expressed by the copula) necessary for the kind of unity that 
allows reference to an object and thus a truth-value.72 Insofar as they are 
synthetic, judgments do not merely unite a plurality of representations, but 
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also determine some object through a concept.73 It is in this sense that Kant 
describes cognition as a “determinate relation of given representations to an
object” (B137, emphasis added). 
Now Kant uses the term ‘determination’ in various senses. One 
particularly prominent use refers to the attribution of a property to an object 
in a judgment.74 In this sense, a determinate judgment contrasts with an 
indeterminate judgment, which occurs through the “merely logical use of the
understanding” (B128; cf. 4:475n.). In the former, a judgment determines 
the object by attributing a feature to the object and thereby excluding its 
opposite (cf. New Elucidation, 1:391).75 In the latter, the judgment leaves the 
object indeterminate by not attributing either the one feature or its opposite 
to the object. Kant maintains (e.g. at Jäsche, 9:111) that all synthetic 
judgments involve the determinate use of concepts (or determinations) (cf. 
20:268.), since the predicate concept, which expresses a determination, is 
“added” to the object referred to by the subject concept, while analytic 
judgments do not because, in paradigmatic cases at least, the subject 
concept already contains the predicate concept.76 This “adding” cannot be 
merely quantitative, but rather consists in an act of predication, that is, in 
the simplest case, in thinking of the feature as being instantiated in an 
object.
4. Bringing Intuition and Concepts Together in Cognition
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One of Kant’s central insights is that even the simplest cases of cognition, 
such as cognizing something before one as a red ball, involve a 
representation that is much more complex than both his empiricist and 
rationalist predecessors had assumed, because it requires that the object be 
both given to us and thought. In finite beings, cognition thus involves 
contributions from two separate faculties, namely sensibility and 
understanding.77 Sensibility establishes an immediate referential relation to 
empirical objects and affords a representation of their non-general (spatio-
temporal) features and thereby satisfies the givenness condition.78 For 
example, if an object acts on our sensibility, it gives rise to sensations in us, 
which allows us to refer to it and represent it and its (particular) color and 
shape. 
But being aware of a red ball in its particular roundness and redness is 
not yet an awareness of it as round and red, i.e. of its having features it 
shares with other round and red objects and that differentiate it from 
rectangular and green things. Cognition requires that the object be 
determined by applying one or more concepts to it, which are complex 
representations consisting of various marks, each of which contributes to 
determining the object to which the concept is applied. By applying the 
concept ‘ball,’ I determine the object as spherical and material and thereby 
classify it with respect to all other objects. Thus, the contribution of the 
understanding is to lend classificatory articulation and inferential structure to
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our cognitions and thereby to make the cognized object intelligible, 
satisfying the thought condition.79
After having surveyed Kant’s understanding of these faculties and how 
each contributes to satisfying the givenness and thought conditions, we can 
now explain how they cooperate in bringing about cognition as a complex 
representation (4.1). This will provide the background necessary to 
understand a recent debate about whether Kant is a conceptualist or a non-
conceptualist about intuitions (4.2). 
4.1. The Cooperation of Sensibility and Understanding in Cognition
Assuming that some object (e.g. a red ball) is given to us through sensibility 
and that we possess concepts (e.g. red, round, material object) to think it, 
how do intuition and concept come together in a cognition? Even if we 
restrict ourselves to singular cognition (such as “This ball is red”), one might 
think of it in two ways. First, it could consist in a judgment containing two or 
more concepts (e.g. ‘ball,’ ‘red’) related by a copula (e.g. ‘is’). Its relation to 
intuition would consist (1) in the objective reality of the concepts (i.e. in the 
possibility of employing them in the synthesis of a sensible manifold) and (2) 
in there being an intuition of a red ball that allows that the subject concept of
the judgment (‘ball’) refers to the object given in the intuition and that the 
predicate concept (‘red’) can then be applied to it through the judgment. In 
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this way, the same object that is given to us is also thought (determined 
through concepts). Although attributing this picture of (singular) cognition to 
Kant is not without its problems,80 he may have this in mind when he says 
that judgments are mediate cognitions of objects (e.g. A68/B93). Let us call 
this the ‘judgment model’ of singular cognition.81 
Second, one might think of singular cognition as akin to perceptual 
awareness of the existence and general features of objects, such as seeing 
something as being red and round. Such an awareness might be thought of 
as resulting from the synthesis of a given sensible manifold (say, of various 
color-sensations located in space) into the representation of an object (such 
as a red ball). Such a representation would have both intuitive and discursive
aspects. As a kind of perceptual awareness, it would be intuitive (though not 
an intuition); as an awareness of general features, it would be discursive 
(though not a concept). It is in this sense that Kant can speak of the 
representation of a house as being “intuition and concept at the same time” 
(Jäsche, 9:33). In being a sensible representation of a particular house, it is 
intuitive; in representing its general features (e.g. its being a house), it is 
discursive. It may not be easy to understand how one and the same 
representation can be both intuitive and discursive, but assuming that we 
can form the representation of a particular object as exhibiting general 
features (as in the case of seeing something as a red ball), it is plausible to 
assume that there are such representations. Let us call this the ‘perception 
model’ of singular cognition.82 On this model, singular cognition consists in a 
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single representation that satisfies both the givenness and the thought 
condition (unlike the judgment model, which has one representation, 
judgment, satisfying the thought condition and another, intuition, satisfying 
the givenness condition). 
The two models do not exclude each other, since they could hold for 
different cases. Moreover, the judgment model would presuppose the 
perception model, if the intuitive representation that underlies a judgment 
such as “This ball is red” must be a singular cognition in the sense of the 
perception model. 
 4.2. Conceptualism vs. Non-Conceptualism
Above, in section 2, we characterized intuitions as satisfying the givenness 
condition by, among other things, representing the particular features of 
objects, that is, by representing features of objects in a way that was not 
already conceptual. Now that we have Kant’s account of how the general 
features of objects are represented by way of concepts, we can consider the 
representational content of intuitions in more detail. Specifically, we can now
examine the exact meaning of Kant’s claim that “intuitions without concepts 
are blind” and thus are not cognitions (A51/B75–76). Different analyses of 
this claim reflect fundamentally different readings of Kant’s account of 
intuition. 
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As a first approximation, we can distinguish two possible 
interpretations: (1) Intuitions without concepts are not cognitions in the 
narrow sense, but could be cognitions in the broader sense of “objective 
representation” because they represent particular objects (without 
representing them as having general features). (2) Intuitions without 
concepts are not even cognitions in the broader sense, since they do not 
represent objects at all.83 Let us call the first interpretation the non-
conceptualist and the second the conceptualist one.84 Note that the 
conceptualist does not have to deny all non-conceptual representational 
content, since sensations may well have representational content (see 2.3). 
Instead, the question is whether intuitions can represent objects without 
concepts.
The non-conceptualist answer can be motivated textually by Kant’s 
definition of an intuition as a singular immediate representation 
(A320/B377), by his claim in the Stufenleiter passage that intuitions are 
cognitions (in the broad sense) (A320/B377), and by passages in which Kant 
says that intuitions (and sensibility) do not require any activity of the 
understanding (e.g. A89–91/B122–23, A21/B35). It can also be motivated 
philosophically by considerations such as the “fine-grainedness” of 
perceptual experience (that seems to outstrip our means of conceptual 
articulation) and the idea that we seem to share our basic perceptual 
capacities with “babes and brutes” who lack concepts but still seem to be 
able to represent objects in some primitive sense. 
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The conceptualist answer, by contrast, can be motivated by other 
passages (e.g. A253/B309), as well as by considerations deriving mainly from
the Transcendental Deduction. There, Kant argues that a representation can 
relate to its object only if the manifold included in that representation falls 
under the unity of apperception (B137), which in turn requires that it be 
unified in accordance with the categories (B143).85 The conceptualist reading
can also be supported by general philosophical considerations, such as the 
intelligibility of perceptual content and its availability to rational thought (as 
a reason for belief) that can be provided only by concepts.
Given this situation, the issue cannot be decided by quoting individual 
passages, but only by developing comprehensive interpretations of Kant’s 
claims and an overall strategy in which the conflicting passages and 
considerations can be integrated.86 It is not our aim here to develop such an 
interpretation, nor to survey the vast literature on the topic, but rather to 
clarify a few of the interpretive options by distinguishing issues that are 
sometimes run together.87
One such issue concerns the different possible representational 
contents of an intuition. Consider two possibilities of what an intuition might 
be:
<ext> 
(R1) the visual representation of a particular instance of redness located at a
particular space and a particular time (cf. A20/B34, A23/B38);</ext>
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<ext>
 (R2) the visual representation of something as a red ball (cf. B143).
</ext>
While (R1) would be an intuition in a non-conceptualist sense, (R2) would be 
an intuition in a conceptualist sense.
Corresponding to these different views of the representational content 
of an intuition are different conceptions of what it means for a representation
(R) to represent an object (O).
<ext>
(O1) R represents O by virtue of visually representing a particular instance of
Fness (e.g. being red). (O is an object in the thin sense in that it consists only
in the instantiation of one particular property.)
</ext>
<ext>
(O2) R represents O by virtue of visually representing it as being F and G. (O 
is an object in the thick sense in that it is a distinct object and its co-
instantiated properties are general.)88
</ext>
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Some of the dispute between the conceptualist and the non-
conceptualist might derive from lack of clarity about what is involved in 
representing an object ((O1) as opposed to (O2)), specifically, from whether 
the thin sense of object involved in (O1) is robust enough to count as an 
object. However, confusion can also arise from the fact that (R1) and (R2) 
are not the only possible descriptions of intuitions. Thus, the representational
content of an intuition might involve not only one particular property, but 
two properties that are instantiated at the same location at the same time 
(redness and roundness) (R1*). Or it might involve not only the instantiation 
of one or more properties, but also their instantiation by an object that is in 
some sense distinct from the properties (something that is red or round) 
though still without the properties being explicitly represented as general 
(R1**). In both cases, the representational content of the intuition would 
have a unity that is more complex than that of (R1) but that falls short of 
(R2). Similarly, one can conceive of different senses of representing objects 
(O1*) and (O1**) corresponding to (R1*) and (R1**) that would not be as thin 
as (O1), but also not as thick as (O2).89 With these (and even finer-grained) 
distinctions in hand, participants in the debate may be able to clarify what 
exactly they mean in asserting or denying that an intuition can represent 
objects without concepts.90
However, a further lack of clarity might arise from not distinguishing 
between two roles a concept might play with respect to an intuition. On the 
one hand, the concept might be applied in such a way that its content is 
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included in the representational content of the intuition. On the other hand, 
the concept might play a role in the formation of the intuition, but without its
content being included in its representational content. Now one might think 
that an intuition is formed by the faculty of sensibility alone. Accordingly, the
sensations that constitute the matter of an intuition might be united by the 
forms of intuition in such a way that an intuition represents a spatiotemporal 
array of particular property-instances at different locations in space at a 
given time, just as (R1) would have it. Specifically, the senses, rather than 
any other faculty, are responsible for the “synopsis” (A94, A97) that causes 
the unity that is present in (R1). 
Yet Kant frequently refers to various kinds of additional syntheses that 
involve the imagination (rather than those that involve the understanding): 
the “synthesis of apprehension” (A98–100) and “synthesis of reproduction” 
(A100–102) in the A-deduction, the “figurative synthesis (synthesis 
speciosa)” in the B-deduction (B151) and the synthesis involved in what Kant
calls “the schematism,” which consists in “providing a concept with its 
image” (A140/B179). Setting aside the complicated interpretative questions 
connected with these passages, the common idea seems to be that the 
application of concepts to objects given through sensibility presupposes a 
logically prior synthesis of the sensible manifold in accordance with the 
categories that Kant attributes to the imagination and that results in an 
intuitive representation of an object. Such a representation would involve a 
unity that does not derive entirely from the senses, namely the unity of 
43
various particular features being co-instantiated, but this unity is 
represented not discursively but rather intuitively. However the details of 
this kind of representation are described, it is non-conceptual insofar as its 
representational content is not conceptual or discursive, but thoroughly 
intuitive. But this does not mean that one could entertain such a 
representation without both having and making use of concepts (albeit not 
by having their content included in the intuition), since it results from a 
synthesis that proceeds “in accordance with the categories” (B152). 
Specifically, the categories provide the rules according to which the manifold
is synthesized in intuition.91 Thus, though its representational content is not 
conceptual (it does not represent the object as F and G), the intuition cannot 
exist without concepts being involved in the synthesis that produces it. So in 
this specific sense, this kind of representation could be viewed as 
“conceptual” rather than “non-conceptual.” If these two senses in which 
intuitions might be called conceptual are not distinguished, there is the 
obvious danger that participants in the debate might talk past each other. 
5. Reason, Science, Metaphysics, and the Limits of Cognition
In addition to sensibility and understanding, Kant posits a faculty of reason. 
Though he characterizes that faculty in various ways, his most fundamental 
and distinctive description is of a spontaneous faculty that seeks conditions 
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for whatever is conditioned, in fact, that seeks the totality of such conditions,
which is itself therefore unconditioned.92 For only when reason has found the 
unconditioned condition of what is conditioned will it have satisfied its 
essential “desires” or “needs” and thus discovered an appropriate “resting 
place” (A584/B612). Kant distinguishes two uses of reason, the logical and 
the real. While the former consists in drawing inferences in syllogisms and 
plays a role in establishing scientific knowledge, the latter attempts to 
establish synthetic a priori cognition of the objects of traditional 
metaphysics. The account of cognition presented above puts us in a position 
to clarify reason’s logical use in syllogisms and science (5.1), and to 
determine its real use in metaphysics (5.2), especially insofar as it relates to 
Kant’s argument for his claim that we cannot have cognition of things in 
themselves.
5.1. Syllogisms and Science
What is distinctive about Kant’s account of the logical use of reason in 
syllogisms is that he thinks of the conclusion of a syllogism as a conditioned 
cognition that follows from its major and minor premises, where the major 
expresses a certain kind of conditioning relation (categorical, hypothetical, or
disjunctive) and the minor is subsumed under the major (see A303–5/B359–
61; Jäsche, 9:120–36). The logical account of concepts supports his doctrine 
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of syllogisms insofar as the subsumptions required for syllogisms are based 
on the containment relations that obtain between concepts.93 Further, insofar
as the major and minor premises of a syllogism are not themselves 
unconditioned, reason seeks higher cognitions from which they would in turn
follow. In this way, reason seeks a chain of syllogisms that ascend from more
specific cognitions to more general cognitions, leading up to highest, 
unconditioned cognitions, which would serve as the first principles of 
science.
In the Metaphysical Foundations of Natural Science, Kant defines 
science proper as cognitions that are systematically ordered according to 
rational principles and established with apodictic certainty, i.e. with 
“consciousness of their necessity” MAN, 4:468). Given the stringency of 
these requirements, Kant denies that chemistry, psychology, history, and 
anthropology are sciences proper. More interestingly, in the Appendix to the 
Transcendental Dialectic Kant argues that several regulative principles are 
“indispensably necessary” for attaining cognition that would be 
systematically related so as to qualify as science (A644/B672). Specifically, 
the principles of homogeneity, specification, and continuity (A658/B686) are 
needed to bring about the systematic unity required for science by directing 
the understanding (in its search for a complete taxonomy of kinds) always to
seek higher and lower concepts as well as a third concept in between any 
two concepts. In this way, one can achieve “the greatest unity [of cognition] 
along side the greatest extension” (A644/B672). 
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5.2. Metaphysics and the Limits of Cognition
The real use of reason, by contrast, concerns principles that pertain to 
objects directly rather than to cognitions about them. Thus, if in its logical 
use reason seeks unconditioned cognitions as the ultimate premises for a 
chain of syllogisms, in its real use it seeks unconditioned objects that 
condition the different objects we experience (see A305–9/B362–66). For 
example, for any body that occupies space, reason will seek the parts that 
compose it, and then the parts of those parts, etc., until it reaches, e.g. 
simples, which, since indivisible, have no further parts that could condition 
them. This kind of real use of reason leads to the formation of ideas that 
represent the objects of traditional metaphysics, namely God, the world as a 
totality (e.g. a totality of simple substances), and the soul, since reason 
arrives at these ideas by thinking the totality of conditions for the different 
(conditioned) objects we experience (see A321–38/B377–96). The real use of 
reason is thus crucial to the project of the first Critique, which investigates 
the possibility of synthetic a priori cognition of the unconditioned objects of 
traditional metaphysics. 
Kant’s strategy for determining whether we can have cognition of the 
objects of traditional metaphysics would seem to derive, at least in part, 
from his reflections on the closely related question of whether we can have 
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cognition of things in themselves. Kant’s position is that we cannot have 
such cognition, but consensus on the exact nature of Kant’s arguments for 
this position has proved elusive.94 The account of cognition described above 
may allow for some progress by helping us to focus on the givenness 
condition on cognition95 and ask: Why can things in themselves not be given 
to us through sensibility? Kant appears to hold that things in themselves can 
affect us, yet what is thereby given is not a thing in itself, but rather an 
appearance. Why must we represent the objects that affect us as 
appearances rather than as they are in themselves?
Insofar as objects given through sensibility are represented by 
intuitions, what makes them represent appearances must be due to either 
the matter or the form of intuition (or both), and a case can be made for 
each. First, because Kant identifies the matter of an empirical intuition as 
sensation and sensations are defined as representations that reflect only the 
way in which objects affect the subject rather than the objects themselves, 
the intuition into which sensations are taken up can represent only how 
these objects appear to us and not as they are in themselves.96 Second, 
because the form of intuition is, for Kant, a merely subjective principle in us 
that organizes and determines whatever sensible manifold is given, any 
intuition based on such a form cannot reflect features of things in 
themselves, but rather must represent appearances.97 A variant on this 
second option would be that since our particular forms of intuition are space 
and time and since things in themselves are not spatio-temporal, our spatio-
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temporal intuitions cannot be of things in themselves. Though these 
arguments are not unproblematic, they are based on fundamental aspects of
Kant’s account of cognition. Moreover, since the arguments are not 
exclusive, Kant may have relied on both.
Kant’s account of cognition sheds light on two further aspects of his 
denial of cognition of things in themselves. First, Kant’s claim can seem more
plausible because cognition (rather than, say, knowledge) is a cognitive state
that requires not only reference, but also a representational content that is 
based on the object’s being given. Thus, Kant’s claim is simply (but still 
controversially) that we cannot have the special kind of cognitive access to 
things in themselves required for cognition, since they are not given to us. 
Even if it was granted that I have a clear concept of the soul, I can neither 
(demonstrably) refer to it nor represent it as having general features (not 
already analytically contained in its concept) because no soul could be given 
to me, and I thus cannot have the kind of cognition required to determine its 
mortality or immortality.98
Second, Kant’s claim that we cannot have cognition of things in 
themselves does not immediately entail that we cannot have knowledge of 
things in themselves. In fact, it has been noted that we do (and in fact must) 
have some limited knowledge of things in themselves.99 For Kant clearly 
claims to know that things in themselves exist, that they are neither spatial 
nor temporal, and that they affect us, and one might even think that we can 
know that the truths of logic (or analytic truths) would have to apply to them.
49
Insofar as knowledge rather than cognition is at issue, it would be necessary 
to carefully delineate the kind of knowledge that Kant denies that we can 
have so that it includes, say, only synthetic knowledge of particular objects. 
Understanding Kant’s claim about knowledge in this way makes it natural to 
think that his argument for it could derive from our inability to have cognition
of things in themselves. For if knowledge requires an objectively sufficient 
justification and if cognitions were required for any objectively sufficient 
justification of particular things, then knowledge of particular things in 
themselves would require cognition of particular things in themselves.
Conclusion
By describing the basic elements and structure of Kant’s notion of theoretical
cognition, we hope to have made the fundamental argument of the first 
Critique clearer. Insofar as cognitions are specific mental states requiring 
that our concepts and judgments determine objects given in sensible 
intuition, one can see what it is that prevents them from being empty 
thoughts or “mere figments of the brain” (blosse Hirngespinste). For us to 
have cognition, an object must be given in sensible intuition in such a way 
that it is present to mind, and our concepts must have a suitable content 
that can apply to it and render it intelligible to us. From Kant’s perspective, it
is a virtue of his general account of cognition that it is consistent with the 
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synthetic a priori status of both mathematics and the pure part of natural 
science. For this allows him to consider whether the claims of traditional 
metaphysics, which are similarly synthetic and a priori, satisfy the specific 
conditions on cognition that he has articulated. What the first Critique shows 
is that, insofar as they are to be based exclusively on theoretical grounds, 
the claims of metaphysics fall short. This conclusion is, however, consistent 
with Kant’s central claim in the Critique of Practical Reason, namely that 
practical considerations can bestow objective reality on ideas in such a way 
that we can extend our cognition to the objects of traditional metaphysics, 
even if only in a practical respect.100
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different understandings of Kant’s notion of cognition (e.g. regarding the 
conceptual or non-conceptual nature of intuition). While important differences 
remain, one aim in writing the present paper was to develop a framework for 
locating and discussing these differences in a fruitful way. 
2 Kant distinguishes between theoretical and practical cognition. The former 
includes several particular kinds of cognition—e.g. scientific, rational, 
mathematical, a priori, and historical. In the following, we focus, albeit not 
exclusively, on Kant’s notion of theoretical cognition in the Critique of Pure 
Reason. References to the Critique of Pure Reason use the standard A/B 
pagination. For other works, we give a short title along with the volume and 
page number of the Academy Edition. All translations are our own, though we 
have consulted and sometimes followed the translations published by 
Cambridge University Press.
3 In other passages, Kant specifies this by asserting that cognition is a 
conscious representation that consciously relates to an object (cf. 9:91, 
24:752).
4 The Jäsche Logik has a somewhat uncertain status, because Jäsche was 
heavily involved in the production of the book. 
5 See also B146, A51/B76–77, and 24:752.
6 Cf. A19/B33, A320/B377.
7 Unfortunately, Kant does not elaborate on the notion of intelligibility relevant 
to the thought condition. In the human case, thinking an object by means of 
concepts or constructing a syllogism involving the object renders it intelligible 
by placing it in a classificatory structure of general features. (See section 3 
below.) How it is satisfied in the divine case is less clear, though intellectual 
intuition clearly requires some kind of intelligibility (or “intellection”).
8 Cf. A15/B29, A50/B74.
9 By regarding this distinction as one in kind, rather than degree, Kant contrasts
his view with that of his predecessors, Locke and Leibniz (A271/B327). 
10 Kant adds that merely indicating “what the intuition of the object is not, 
without being able to say what is then contained in it” is insufficient for 
cognition in this sense (B149).
11 In addition to ‘Erkenntnis’ and ‘erkennen,’ Kant uses terms such as ‘Kenntnis’
and ‘bekannt,’ which have somewhat different connotations.
12 In his influential English translation of the first Critique Norman Kemp Smith 
rendered ‘cognition’ as ‘knowledge,’ following the lead of many translations of 
the Latin term ‘cognitio.’ 
13 See Chignell, “Kant’s Concepts of Justification” and Pasternack, “Kant on 
Knowledge, Opinion, and the Threshold for Assent.”
14 Kant allows that the kind of certainty required for knowledge can rest on 
indirect proof, e.g. by reductio ad absurdum (cf. 9:71). 
15 For fuller discussion of the relations between cognition and knowledge, see 
Watkins and Willaschek, “Kant on Cognition and Knowledge.”
16 Note that this way of speaking does not prejudge the issue, to be addressed 
in section 4.2, whether intuitions represent, and refer to, objects independently
from concepts.
17 For illuminating discussion of Kant’s notion of the intuitive intellect, see 
Förster, The Twenty-Five Years of Philosophy.
18 Kant’s narrow sense of cognition is thus not restricted from the outset to a 
combination of sensible intuition and discursive concepts, but rather is defined 
more abstractly in terms of givenness and thought in a way that ought to be 
acceptable even to rationalists, such as Leibniz or Wolff.
19 Kant’s account of cognition in general does not, however, presuppose 
Transcendental Idealism and can be stated largely independently of it.
20 Kant speaks of both objects and representations as given. We discuss the 
latter case in section 3.1. Moreover, Kant sometimes uses the term ‘given’ to 
refer to the mere existence of objects (e.g. A498/B526). Note also that Kant 
distinguishes between the immediate givenness of an object in intuition and a 
derivative, mediate kind of givenness (A156/B195). We restrict our discussion 
here to the former, fundamental case. On the relevant notion of immediacy, cf. 
section 2.4 below. 
21 Cf. A223/B271 where Kant says that we can “give” an object corresponding 
to the concept of a triangle by constructing it. So construction does entail 
givenness. However, since mathematical objects do not exist in the same 
sense in which empirical objects do, one might be tempted to infer, against our
view, that givenness does not entail existence. We want to resist this 
temptation by attributing to Kant the following position. Since what is given in 
the construction of a mathematical object in pure intuition is only the form of 
the object and not either its matter or its qualities (see B147, A714/B742, and 
A719/B747), and since the (empirical) existence of an object pertains to its 
matter, it stands to reason that the (empirical) existence of the object is not 
given with the construction of a mathematical object. But, first, this is 
consistent with saying that the existence of the object’s formal properties is 
given in construction in a priori intuition (where “existence” is not to be 
understood along the lines of the postulates of empirical thinking, but in a 
sense appropriate to “formal” objects). One could thus say that in the special 
case of mathematics Kant’s notion of givenness is somewhat attenuated in this
respect. Yet, second, Kant repeatedly adds a further qualification to the 
mathematical case. To count as mathematical cognition, not only must a 
mathematical concept have an a priori intuition in which (the form of) its object
is constructed, but that a priori intuition must also be applied to empirical 
intuition (B147). That is, even if (empirical) existence cannot be constructed in 
a priori intuition (which Kant asserts, e.g. at A179/B221–22), for mathematical 
cognition to be cognition he requires that mathematical concepts nonetheless 
be related to the existence of objects by having the requisite a priori intuition 
be applied to empirical intuition. In this way, he preserves the content of his 
notion of cognition as much as possible, while recognizing the important 
differences that obtain in the case of mathematics.
22 Kant does seem to allow for intuitions of the imagination, where the object 
does not exist (e.g. 7:167). We take “intuition” in these passages to stand for 
intuitive representation, not for intuitions proper. (For the distinction between 
intuitions and intuitive representations, see section 2.6 below). 
23 The claim that givenness is a condition for cognition needs to be qualified for 
cognition of past objects and universal cognition. For the former, it may be 
sufficient that the object has been given at some time. For the latter, it may 
suffice that each object could, in principle, be given. 
24 This raises the question of whether sensible objects could be given to God, 
despite Kant’s explicit denial that God could have sensible cognition (28:1051).
25 Cf. Inaugural Dissertation: “the sensation which constitutes the matter of a 
sensible representation is, indeed, evidence for [arguit] the presence of 
something sensible” (Inaugural Dissertation, 2:393).
26 A causal reading of sensibility might be preserved if one viewed the 
representation of mathematical objects as an effect of internal causes, with the
mind acting on its own sensibility (via self-affection), as Kant seems to suggest 
in various passages (e.g. B154). However, given that affection generates 
sensations, one would have to explain why such cognition would not be 
empirical.
27 See also the remarks about the difference between logical and aesthetic 
distinctness (Deutlichkeit) in the Jäsche Logik (9:62).
28 Kant explicitly distinguishes between discursive (or logical) clarity, which 
occurs through concepts, and intuitive (or aesthetic) clarity, which derives from
examples or illustrations and involves intuitions (Axvii-xviii; also cf. Blomberg 
Logik 24:130 and Jäsche, 9:35). For an illuminating account of the distinction 
between intuitive and discursive clarity, see Grüne, Blinde Anschauung, ch. 1.3.
29 Empirical concepts must have empirical content and only sensations could 
give rise to the empirical element of that content.
30 See Jankowiak, “Sensations as Representations in Kant.” Sellars ascribes an 
analogical content to sensations in Science and Metaphysics. 
31 Cf. Sellars, Science and Metaphysics, 9.
32 This definition of intuition is completely generic and also obtains for 
intellectual intuition.
33 We discuss the representational content of intuitions further in section 4.2.
34 By saying that concepts are essentially types and intuitions essentially 
tokens, we allow for the obvious fact that concept-applications on particular 
occasions are tokens, while intuitions, too, fall under types. However, while the 
contribution of a concept-token to a judgment such as “This is a ball” is fully 
determined by the concept-type involved (here ball), the intuition is related to 
an individual object (this ball) in a way that does not derive from its 
instantiating the corresponding type (intuition of a ball). In addition to these 
two senses of singularity, an intuition might be singular in referring to 
individuals. 
35 That empirical intuitions involve sensations does not violate the immediacy 
condition because sensations do not directly represent objects.
36 See Parsons, Mathematics in Philosophy: Selected Essays.
37 See Howell, “Intuition, Synthesis, and Individuation in the Critique of Pure 
Reason,” and Brandt, “Transzendentale Aesthetik.” A further possibility is that 
intuitions refer via singular or intuitive rather than general marks, where 
singular marks are consistent with the immediacy of reference (Smit, “Kant on 
Marks”). The textual support for singular marks is thin, and one might also 
allow for singular marks, but deny that reference is established through them. 
See section 3.2 below for discussion.
38 Note that talk of “spatio-temporal location” glosses over the fact that 
external objects, according to Kant, are temporal only indirectly (by being the 
objects of inner sense). We abstract from this point in what follows.
39 Kant also mentions an a priori manifold for a priori intuition (see B150, B161).
40 Kant uses the term ‘anschaulich’ (a cognate of Anschauung, which is 
translated as intuition) as well as the corresponding latinate term ‘intuitiv’ 
(which is translated as intuitive). Further, he uses the intuitive-discursive 
contrast in several ways and applies it to a variety of items: modes of 
representation (Vorstellungsart; cf. Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:351; 
Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 7:244), kinds of cognition 
(Jäsche, 9:33; Anthropology from a Pragmatic Point of View, 7:191), 
understanding (Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:407), distinctness (Axvii) 
and certainty (A162/B201) as well as judgments (Prolegomena to Any Future 
Metaphysics, 4:281) and principles (A733/B761). 
41  Cf. e.g. Critique of the Power of Judgment, 5:409, Jäsche, 9:58).
42 Given that judgments and principles are essentially general, the sense in 
which they are intuitive must be derivative in some way, e.g. by depending on 
intuitive representations.
43  Cf. B40; On a Discovery Whereby any new Critique of Pure Reason is to be 
made Superfluous by an Older One, 8:210.
44 But not in all cases, since in calling “intuitive” judgments and principles 
intuitive Kant is sometimes saying that their epistemic justification depends on 
construction in pure intuition.
45 Allais, “Kant’s One World,” 59n., points to this passage to distinguish 
between intuitions and intuitive representations, but without placing that 
distinction in the wider context of Kant’s intuitive/discursive distinction. 
46 Against this, Stephenson, “Kant on the Object-Dependence of Intuition and 
Hallucination,” points out that Kant’s account of hallucinations differs from his 
account of veridical intuitions only in that the causal relation that makes the 
latter veridical is missing in the former. But this is not inconsistent with the 
point that Kant thought of intuitions as object-involving representations; it only 
explains why, according to Kant, hallucinations can be subjectively 
indistinguishable from intuitions. 
47 Kant uses the term ‘understanding’ both in a wider sense for the faculty of 
discursive thought (which includes reason in the narrow sense as the faculty of 
syllogisms) and in a narrower sense for the faculty of concepts. In this section, 
we are primarily concerned with the latter. Kant uses the term ‘judgment’ to 
refer either to the act of combination or to the product combined. In the latter 
sense, a judgment is both the combination of various representations and itself
a representation (see Jäsche, 9:101); in considering judgments as 
representations, Kant follows Meier Auszug aus der Vernunftlehre, §292. 
Something similar is true of inferences, which Kant considers complex 
judgments (see A307/B364; 24:280).
48 Note that Kant sometimes uses the term ‘thinking’ (denken) in a different 
sense to contrast with ‘cognizing’ (erkennen) (Bxxvi). 
49 For a reading that closely links spontaneity to activity and receptivity to 
passivity, see Engstrom, “Understanding and Sensibility.” Grüne suggests that 
the spontaneity of the understanding consists in actualizing an innate capacity 
for producing representations (Blinde Anschauung, 168). 
50 For a characterization of spontaneity in terms of (relative) independence 
from input, see Sellars, “…this I or He or It (the thing) which thinks…” and 
Kitcher, Kant’s Transcendental Psychology.
51 According to McDowell, Mind and World, the dualism of “conceptual scheme”
and “the Given” is a response to a reading of spontaneity according to which 
the workings of the latter, if unconstrained by sensibility, are arbitrary by not 
being answerable to an objective reality. 
52 See Jäsche, 9:58 and 9:91.While some take ‘discursive' to mean conceptual, 
(e.g. Longuenesse, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 6), others identify it with 
the understanding’s dependence on objects being “given” to it for cognition. 
(See Pippin, Kant’s Theory of Form, 28, and Allison, Kant’s Transcendental 
Idealism, 12–13.)
53 See section 3.2 below.
54 See A19/B33, A68/B93, A320/B377, and Jäsche, 9:91.
55 This distinction corresponds roughly to the two meanings of ‘concept’ that 
Longuenesse identifies, Kant and the Capacity to Judge, 47.
56 Although Kant never explains his account of marks in his published writings 
(besides the Jäsche Logik), they rely on it heavily (see 2:47–61; A727/B755; 
4:484; 6:227). The claim that all concepts contain marks is problematic if, as 
Kant thinks, there is a highest concept.
57 Occasionally, Kant seems to acknowledge “intuitive” marks (15:299–300, 
24:725; cf. Stuhlmann-Laeisz, Kants Logik, 73, 89; Smit, “Kant on Marks,” 254; 
Grüne, Blinde Anschauung, 68). This may not be compatible with Kant’s claim 
that marks are general (A320/B377; Jäsche, 9:58).
58 A mark M can serve as a ground of cognition (ratio cognoscendi) with respect
to some object to which M applies insofar as some other cognition of that 
object can be gained on the basis of M. For instance, we may (defeasibly) infer 
from a stain’s being red that it is a blood stain (24:753). See Stuhlmann-Laiesz,
Kants Logik, 90, and Haag, Erfahrung und Gegenstand, 164, for similar 
accounts and Grüne, Blinde Anschauung, 58, and Prien, Kants Logik der 
Begriffe, 58, for contrasting readings.
59 Kant speaks of both concepts (or representations) and things as being 
“contained under” a concept (Jäsche, 9:95–96). Here, we are interested 
primarily in containment-relations between concepts. Also, note that 
‘containment in’ is not an entailment-relation, but a part-whole relation 
between representations and their parts. (Intuitions, too, contain their parts in 
them; cf. B40). ‘Containment under,’ by contrast, is a logical entailment-
relation.
60 Since the marks contained in a concept may vary from person to person 
(A727–28/B755–56), it is unclear whether Kant’s logical account of concepts 
can allow for concepts being public, presumably depending on whether there is
sufficient overlap between the marks contained in the concepts that different 
people have. 
61 On Kant’s account of synthesis, see Hoppe, Synthesis bei Kant, and Grüne, 
Blinde Anschauung.
62 Cf. B135. Note that this sense of ‘given’ pertains to representations, not 
objects (see section 2.1 above). 
63 While Kant mainly speaks of this manifold as a “manifold of representations 
given in an intuition” (B135), he also mentions a “manifold of intuitions” 
(B154). For present purposes, we use ‘manifold of intuition’ to designate a 
manifold of sensible representations, which can be intuitions, sensations, or 
regions of space and time.
64 Kant identifies a concept with the representation “under” which 
representations are united in an act of synthesis (A68/B93), but also with the 
rule that guides this act of synthesis (A106) and with the consciousness of that 
unity (A103). Despite these different formulations the fundamental picture 
remains the same.
65 In his logic lectures Kant offers an account of the generality of concepts in 
terms of the three logical acts of comparison, reflection, and abstraction, “by 
which concepts are being produced concerning their form [i.e. their 
generality]” (Jäsche, 9:94). However, this account cannot explain the generality
of concepts, since the comparison of objects with respect to their similarities 
and differences already presupposes general representations. Kant’s 
Reflexionen suggest he is aware of this point; cf. Refl. 2854, 16:547; Refl. 2880,
16:557; Refl. 2883, 16:558. Most interpreters take this account to be limited to 
empirical concept formation. Others, most notably Longuenesse, Kant and the 
Capacity to Judge, think that this account holds for all concepts, as Kant claims 
(Jäsche, 9:94).
66 See n. 33 above.
67 See Grüne, Blinde Anschauung, 51–52, for a clear exposition of these options.
68 Intuition is thus required not only for the givenness-condition, but also for the
thought condition. 
69 Note that “objective reality” can be read in at least two ways, as involving 
either reference or ostensible reference (i.e. reference that can be established 
either empirically or by means of a transcendental deduction). Accordingly, 
Kant’s claim that concepts without objective reality are empty will mean either 
that they do not refer to objects at all or that we cannot establish whether they
refer. On Kant’s use of ‘objective reality,’ see Zöller, Theoretische 
Gegenstandsbeziehung bei Kant. 
70 But how can one tell whether something given in intuition can be cognized by
applying a concept? While one could note that the object exhibits the marks 
contained in the concept, the question obviously reappears with respect to the 
marks. Kant therefore insists that the application of concepts to objects cannot 
be based on general marks or criteria (see A133/B172). Since one cannot state 
explicitly (in discursive form) the rule that guides the application of concepts, 
Kant attributes it to the “blind” working of the imagination (A78/B103).
71 The question how concepts can have “objective reality” or “latch on” to the 
world is particularly pressing, according to Kant, in the case a priori concepts 
(A85/B117). For empirical concepts, Kant takes the general outline of an 
answer to be readily available (by recourse to experience). We take the 
psychological account of concepts to apply to both a priori and empirical 
concepts. 
72 Despite its centrality to his views, we cannot discuss Kant’s complex account 
of the unity of apperception.
73 In the following, we bracket well-known problematic cases of judgments such
as “the round square is round.”
74 Relatedly, by ‘determination,’ Kant often means a general feature of that 
object.
75 As noted (note 9 above), Kant holds that genuine cognition must represent a 
positive feature of an object. This could mean that cognition requires a positive
rather than a merely negative predicate. To explain the distinction between 
positive and negative predicates in detail would require consideration of Kant’s 
distinctions between negative and infinite judgment (A71–3/B97–8) and 
between logical and transcendental negation (A574–5/B602–3).
76 For discussion of this issue, see Lee, “The Determinate-Indeterminate 
Distinction.”
77 Kant’s distinction between sensibility and understanding thus aligns three 
distinctions that did not always go together in the history of philosophy: 
between sources of representations (senses vs. intellect), between 
representations of different scope (singular vs. general) and between kinds of 
representational content (intuitive vs. discursive).
78 The immediate referential relation in the case of mathematics would be 
established by the object being constructed in pure intuition.
79 For these classifications and inferential relations not to be a “mere play” of 
representations, however, concepts must also have “objective reality.”
80 For instance, Kant’s general logic does not have the means to express the 
distinction drawn in transcendental logic between singular and universal 
judgments. 
81 This model can be extended to include cognitions consisting in general 
(“some A are B”) and universal judgments (“all A are B”). For such judgments 
to count as cognitions, (1) the concepts they contain must possess “objective 
reality” and (2) there must be possible corresponding singular cognitions (i.e. 
cognitions of particular A’s being B). One might suppose that judgments must 
also be true to qualify as cognitions, but Kant does not obviously accept that 
(see Watkins and Willaschek, “Kant on Cognition and Knowledge”). 
82 Cognitions on the perception model are not judgmental in the sense of 
consisting only of concepts and a copula. They might, however, be judgmental 
in a wider sense of judgment as a complex of representations unified under a 
concept. 
83 Alternately, one could argue: since intuitions represent objects, and 
representing objects requires concepts, there cannot be intuitions without 
concepts. 
84 For a non-conceptualist reading, see e.g. Rohs, “Bezieht sich nach Kant die 
Anschauung unmittelbar auf Gegenstände?” and Allais, “Kant and Non-
Conceptual Content”; for a conceptualist take, Allison, Kant’s Transcendental 
Idealism; for a mediating position and a helpful overview of the debate, see 
Grüne, Blinde Anschauung.
85 On the relation between the conceptualism/non-conceptualism issue and the 
B-deduction, see Hanna, “Kant’s Non-Conceptualism,” and Grüne, “Is There a 
Gap?”. 
86 For a similar point, see Hanna, “Kant’s Theory of Judgment.” 
87 See McLear, “Two Kinds of Unity,” for a recent attempt at distinguishing 
different options and looking for a compromise position.
88 For a similar distinction in this context, see Allais, “Kant and Non-Conceptual 
Content,” 405.
89 These distinctions could then be aligned in different ways with Kant’s own 
distinction between “appearances” as “indeterminate object[s] of an empirical 
intuition” (A20/B34) and “phaenomena” as “appearances, to the extent that as 
objects they are thought in accordance with the unity of the categories” (A248–
49).
90 It may also be helpful to distinguish between internalist and externalist 
senses of representing an object.
91 How the involvement of the categories affects the representational content 
of the intuition is a separate question.
92 If objects are given through sensible intuition and thought through the 
understanding’s concepts, they are comprehended through reason’s ideas of 
the unconditioned (which guide the formation of syllogisms). 
93 Basing syllogisms exclusively on containment-relations is problematic, since 
some syllogisms are valid solely in virtue of their form and not because of 
containment-relations.
94 For different reconstructions of Kant’s argument, see Strawson, The Bounds 
of Sense; Langton, Kantian Humility; Hogan, “How to Know Unknowable Things 
in Themselves”; and Chignell, “Real Repugnance.” For critical discussion, see, 
e.g. Ameriks, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques. How one reconstructs Kant’s 
argument will also depend on how one understands the distinction between 
things in themselves and appearances. For different readings, cf. e.g. Prauss, 
Kant und das Problem der Dinge an sich; Allison, Kant’s Transcendental 
Idealism; Guyer, Kant and the Claims of Knowledge; Allais, “Kant’s One World”; 
Rosefeldt, “Dinge an sich und sekundäre Qualitäten.” 
95 One might also focus on the thought condition and argue that since only 
concepts with objective reality can determine objects and since our concepts of
things in themselves fail to have objective reality, we cannot have cognition of 
things in themselves. Whether this is a distinct line of argument depends on 
how objective reality is understood and what argument there is for thinking 
that our concepts of things in themselves lack objective reality.
96 See, for example, the passivity argument described by Ameriks, Kant’s 
Theory of Mind.
97 One controversial assumption implicit in this step is that the matter that is 
organized by the form cannot represent real features of things in themselves, 
but rather must be transformed by the form. 
98 Kant comes close to, but stops short of such claims in a difficult footnote at 
B422–3.
99 This recognition was the basis for the first half of Jacobi’s famous critical 
remark that without things in themselves one cannot enter Kant’s “system” 
(but that with them one cannot remain in it). For useful discussions of the kinds
of knowledge of things in themselves that Kant is and is not denying, see 
Ameriks, Interpreting Kant’s Critiques.
100 We are grateful to Karl Ameriks, Clinton Tolley, and audiences at the 
University of Frankfurt and the University of Chicago where earlier versions of 
this paper were presented, and to two anonymous readers for the Journal of 
the History of Philosophy for extremely helpful feedback. 
